¿Dónde están los datos?: New Working Paper

Posted on June 30, 2020July 3, 2020 by kheinle

06/30/20 — Justice in Mexico, a research-based program at the University of San Diego, released a working paper by Héctor Esteban García García entitled, “¿Dónde están los datos? Reflexiones, conclusiones y retos en la compilación de indicadores de desempeño del Sistema de Justicia Penal Acusatorio.” The study is a result of the #encifras project that compiles a series of indicators curated by Justice in Mexico as part of the “Justicia en Marcha” initiative to measure the Accusatorial Criminal Justice System (Sistema de Justicia Penal Acusatorio, SJPA). Specifically, it analyzes the process of collecting such information and the conclusions that can be drawn from the data. It then highlights the challenges that the SJPA faces and offers several recommendations on ways to strengthen the system’s evaluation process. The results suggest that although some information is sufficiently shared, there is room for improvement. If tracking and reporting was completed on time and in full, it could ultimately strengthen the functioning of the SJPA.

García García describes the complex process employed to gather information related to the functioning of the SJPA. This consisted of identifying 49 indicators that could be used to track the use of specific penal system tools. This included indicators that reflect acts from the crime reporting stage, those that occurred during mediation or restorative justice when the case is not funneled through the whole judicial process, and those that occurred during the court stage (e.g., investigations initiated, oral trials, and courtroom sentences). He drew information on these indicators from 77 public documents spanning 20 Mexican states. He also conducted a series of information requests from the 33 attorney generals or public prosecutor’s offices, and from the 33 judiciaries (both state and federal). Additionally, from April 2018 to July 2019, García García filed requests, which led to 309,141 pieces of data submitted pertaining to the SJPA between 2012 and 2019. This allowed Justice in Mexico to create a robust dataset from which he could analyze the SJPA.

The working paper analyzes who actually shared information, from where, when, and in what quantity. Ultimately, 73% of attorney generals and public prosecutor’s offices and 76% of judiciaries submitted the requested data. Because a quarter of respondents did not share disaggregated information, the author had to aggregate the information using the common denominator to standardize the indicators. By lumping the indicators all into one state-wide yearly total, as 25% of the states did, this prohibits one from analyzing the SJPA’s functioning at the judicial district level based on each indicator. This ultimately hampers one’s ability to evaluate the SJPA and to make necessary improvements or modifications to strengthen the system.

The author also noted that on average, respondents only submitted 74% of the information that was requested. States in the north, south, and southeast of Mexico reported more information than those in central Mexico and along the Gulf Coast. Five states – Campeche, Durango, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, and Quintana Roo – submitted 100% of the information requested, whereas Guerrero and Querétaro only turned in about 10% each.

García García also highlighted the everchanging capacity and availability of judicial system operators to be able to respond to such information requests. Additionally, those that do respond oftentimes do not use consistent reporting mechanisms, thus making it difficult to analyze data trends over time. For example, the Aguascalientes’ Judiciary only reported 15% of information requested during the first solicitation, but jumped to 51% by the fourth. The State of México similarly increased from 30% reporting to 90% by the end. Other states’ reporting fluctuated, too, but in the reverse, going from higher reporting during the first few solicitations and dropping considerably over time.

Finally, the author noted that much of the data submitted was not detailed enough to allow for the sufficient evaluation of SJPA indicators. This included information pertaining to the use of pre-trial detention (prisión preventiva) and the lack of detail by some states on alternative justice methods used, such as mediation, reconciliation, and restorative justice, all of which are key components of the SJPA.

From the data collected, García García concluded several points about the SJPA’s use, functioning, and effectiveness throughout Mexico.

First, the data suggests that the tools that make up the penal system are more frequently used in northern, southern, and southeastern Mexico. When the tools are employed (e.g., oral trials, mediation), it results in quicker trials, reparation agreements, and ‘conditional suspension of the process’ (suspensión condicional del proceso), a special alternative justice procedure that suspends the process when the accused complies with a series of conditions and a reparation plan. The conditional suspension was ultimately found to be the most frequently used tool within the penal system nationwide.

Second, pre-trial detention (prisión preventiva) is still used in 38% of the cases when comparing it to the number of indictments reported (autos de vinculación a proceso). Pre-trial detention is used far more widely in some states (e.g., Michoacán, Sonora, Yucatán) than in others (e.g., Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Zacatecas). Still in 51% of the cases, pre-trial detention was mandated by law based on the crime (de oficio).

Finally, the information confirmed that oral trials were only used in about 11% of cases when considering the number of indictments reported. García García noted that this could be proof that one of the main objectives of the SJPA – to decrease the number of cases that go through to full trial – could actually be being achieved. Ultimately, the author concluded that judicial systems operators are not taking advantage of all of the penal systems’ tools.

Given the conclusions drawn from the data collected, García García identified three main challenges that face the SJPA.

The first he notes is making sure the National Transparency Platform (Plataforma Nacional de Transparencia) is functioning optimally. This platform is intended to be the avenue through which information requests are submitted and responded. Considering the inconsistencies and lack of comprehensive responses that the author received for this Working Paper, he highlighted the concern that civilians are being denied access to full information when they request it.

The second major challenge is the lack of instruments or avenues in place to guarantee that attorneys generals, public prosecutors, and judiciaries provide information when called upon. The author drew attention to the Unidades de Transparencia, or the governmental units that are intended to respond to these information requests, highlighting their limited operational capacities as a weakness in the system.

The third hurdle that faces the SJPA is the inconsistent reporting by states on penal system processes and tools, and the lack of accountability to ensure they properly and timely respond to information requests. In order to do so, the author suggests charging the Executive Secretariat of National Public Security (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SESNSP) or the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) – two agencies who regularly work with data and information – with overseeing the tracking and management of SJPA data. He also suggests the Legislative Branch become more involved, specifically reforming an article in the General Transparency Law (Ley General de Transparencia), among others, that currently leaves the states’ obligation to disaggregate data somewhat ambiguous.

The author offered three key reflections at the conclusion of the Working Paper.

First, he reiterated that the data used for this publication was incomplete due to the fact that nearly one third of all respondents did not submit comprehensive or uniform information. Therefore, it was insufficient to fully evaluate the level at which SJPA tools are being utilized and employed.

Second, the data showed that some SJPA tools are indeed used more regularly than others, such as the conditional suspension. Meanwhile, the common use of pre-trial detention is concerning.

Finally, García García concludes that the challenges of reporting timely and complete data need to be overcome so that analyses of the SJPA can truly focus on improving the system’s functioning and efficiency.

Download Paper

About the Author:

Héctor Esteban García García is a Mexican lawyer native from Aguascalientes. He graduated from the School of Law at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and is currently enrolled in a graduate program on Justice, Victims, and Peace Building at the National University of Colombia. He has collaborated with non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights training and analysis of the criminal justice system in Mexico and has actively collaborated at UNAM’s Human Rights Program. Since 2016, he is a Research Associate at University of San Diego’s Justice in Mexico. His academic and professional interests include criminal justice, transitional justice, and human rights.

2019 Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico Report

Posted on April 29, 2019April 30, 2019 by Ashley Ashley Ahrens-Viquez

Download the full report here

04/30/19- Justice in Mexico, a research-based program at the University of San Diego, released its 2019 report on Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, co-authored by Laura Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk. This report analyzes the latest available data to broadly assess the current state of violence, organized crime, and human rights in Mexico. The tenth edition in a series is published under a new title to reflect the gradual shift that has occurred to the restructuring illicit drug trade and the rise of new organized crime groups.

In 2018, Mexico saw record violence with 28,816 homicide cases and 33,341 victims reported by the Mexican National Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP). This reflects the continued augmentation in violent crime in Mexico for more than a decade with a notable increase in the last few years. The homicide rate has dramatically escalated from 16.9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 as reported to UNODC to 27.3 per 100,000 in 2018 based on SNSP figures. In this and past reports, the authors attribute much of the violence, between a third to a half, to the presence of organized crime groups, particularly drug trafficking organizations.

According to the report, violence has become more pervasive throughout the country but remains highly concentrated in a few specific areas, especially in the major drug trafficking zones located in the northwest and the Pacific Coast. The top ten most violent municipalities in Mexico accounted for 33.6% of all homicides in Mexico in 2018, with 24.7% concentrated in the top five: Tijuana (2,246), Ciudad Juárez (1,004), Acapulco (839), Cancún-Benito Juárez (537), Culiacán (500).

Tijuana’s rate of 115 homicide cases per 100,000 inhabitants ranks second to Acapulco’s rate of 127 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. According to Baja California State’s Secretary of Public Security (SSP) reporting, Tijuana saw a significant increase in 2018 of 41% victims up from 2017.

The authors have found that Mexican organized crime groups have become more fragmented, decentralized, and diversified in their activities. Notably, violence in the Mexican state of Guanajuato appears to have risen due to the increased presence of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and an increase in the prevalence of petroleum theft (huichicol). At least nine municipalities in Guanajuato had a murder rate of more than 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Record violence in Mexico has disproportionally affected certain populations (e.g. politicians, journalist, and men). In 2018, a major election year, there were 37 victims among mayors, mayoral candidates, and former-mayors. These numbers are up slightly from 35 cases in 2017 but demonstrate a significant increase from 14 victims in 2015 and 6 victims in 2016. A 2018 Justice in Mexico study found that in recent years Mexican journalists were at least three times more likely to be murdered than the general population, while mayors were at least nine times more likely. There were 16 journalists and media workers that were killed in 2018. Additionally, the report finds that men are 8.3 times more likely to be homicide victims than women, with 28,522 male homicide victims.

All told, the authors of the report estimate that over 150,000 people were murdered during the six years of the Peña Nieto administration, the most homicides during any presidential term in recent Mexican history. The current Lopez Obrador administration has proposed a new security agenda centered on citizen security, changes in federal law enforcement, and efforts to minimize tensions in U.S.-Mexican relations. Two of the most important measures that the new government has put forward are the creation of a autonomous federal prosecutor and a national guard.

Download the full report here

New Working Paper: Immigration and National Security: An Empirical Assessment of Central American Immigration and Violent Crime in the United States

Posted on January 28, 2019January 28, 2019 by Ashley Ashley Ahrens-Viquez

January 25, 2019- In his first primetime Oval Office address, President Donald Trump called on Congress to address what he called a “growing humanitarian and security crisis” at the United States’ southern border, spawned in part by the recent arrival of a caravan of 6,500 migrants from Central America’s Northern Triangle region.[1] In her paper, titled “Immigration and National Security: An Empirical Assessment of Central American Immigration and Violent Crime in the United States,” Daphne Blanchard examines the extent of the potential threat by gathering quantitative data of previous Central American migration flows and the impact they have had on violence in American communities. The author contends that as rhetoric from high-level politicians and news media makes connections between violent crime and immigration, political parties’ stances on immigration become more divergent — leading to the inability to agree on comprehensive immigration reform. Not only does this research add to the understanding of the potential threat of these particular migrants to U.S. communities, its findings can be generalized to the overall public debate of the nature of immigration and national security.

Data source: U.S. Census Bureau

Ms. Blanchard found that Central American migration has been hyperinflated in scope and potential for insecurity. Migrants from the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) region, formed by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, have indeed surged over the past two decades–their numbers more than double the estimated 1.5 million people from that region in 2000–and the number of unaccompanied minors and families crossing the US-Mexico border has dramatically increased since 2008.[2] However, the author argues the importance of putting their numbers in perspective, noting that this subset of immigrants constitutes less than one percent of the share of the overall U.S. population.

The evidence compiled by Ms. Blanchard suggests that the surge in migration from the Northern Triangle to the United States has not been accompanied by increases in violent crime that would warrant sounding the national security threat alarm. Not only did overall U.S. violent crime rates descend as Central American migration share rose; but the influx of these foreigners in 27 metro areas showed no correlation when compared to the violent crime rate changes during 2012 to 2017. When compared to homicide rate changes, the weak correlation is even more evident; and in the vast majority of cases, homicide rates declined as immigration climbed significantly. It is interesting to note that the only metro area to experience a reduction in Northern Triangle concentration was Columbus, Ohio, which also experienced a 20 percent rise in homicide rates. Not one of the 27 metros with high concentration of immigrants from the NTCA region is within the top ten of the most violent metros in the United States.

Northern Triangle Immigration and Homicides

Data Source: US. Census, FBI Uniform Crime Report

The brutal gang of El Salvadoran origins, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), and claims of it infiltrating American communities, has received high level attention in social and news media. Ms. Blanchard compiled data to understand the scope and reach of this transnational gang to ascertain its potential ability to disrupt the stability and security of the nation. In her study, Ms. Blanchard found that according to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), approximately ten thousand MS-13 members inhabit the United States, amounting to 0.3 percent of the overall U.S. population.^[3] By comparison, there are approximately 1.4 million gang members living in the United States that make up more than 33,000 gangs.^[4] The Cato Institute reports that 0.1 percent of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol arrests at the border mid-year in 2018 were MS-13 gang members, similar to the statistics from prior years.[5] Of the 1.2 million violent crime offenses committed in the United States between 2012 and 2017, 345 were committed by members of the MS-13 gang.[6] Therefore, the author contends that although a legitimate concern for the communities which it inhabits, this criminal organization does not have the potential to disrupt the security of the United States as a whole. She suggests that the violence of this subgroup of a subgroup should be addressed at a local level and separated from the immigration dialogue. Ms. Blanchard contends that the conflating of all immigrants with the MS-13 gang, as has been done repeatedly through President Trump’s tweets and speeches, is unfounded and problematic.

The author offers several policy recommendations to address the surge in Central American migration, to reduce the burden on host countries, and to facilitate balanced immigration dialogue. First, the author suggests engaging media, community, and non-governmental organizations in an effort to balance the dialogue surrounding the migrants and inform the American public of the extent of the threat, thus encouraging fact-based immigration policy-making and aiding in the migrants’ assimilation. The author also urges these groups to highlight the positive results occurring in the Northern Triangle region to audiences in both in the NTCA and the United States. She contends that the hopelessness that drives migrants from their homes could be replaced with increased confidence in local governance and civic action to support the ongoing efforts towards stability and economic opportunities.

Ms. Blanchard calls on the United States government to offer sustained and increasing support to sending communities to reduce the push factors of migration. In addition, Ms. Blanchard urges the United States to support other host countries to create additional safe havens in the region through the offsetting of the onboarding costs and engaging in cooperative security initiatives. She points out that if Mexico is unable to shoulder the burden of absorbing the new arrivals or if the migrants are unable to find safe haven in Mexico, the United States is obligated by international law to hear their asylum claims on U.S. soil. Another recommendation the author offers is to give priority to bilateral workforce development initiatives that have the potential to reduce the need to migrate northward. Finally, Ms. Blanchard suggests that the United States reevaluates the traditional resettlement-based international refugee policy and consider a development-based one, which can transform refugees from a burden to a benefit for the host country.

Works Cited

[1] Times, The New York. 2019. “Full Transcripts: Trump’s Speech on Immigration and the Democratic Response.” The New York Times, January 9, 2019, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/politics/trump-speech-transcript.html.

[2] Lesser, G, and J Batalova. “Central American Immigrants in the United States.” Migration Policy Institute, April 5, 2017.

[3] Cara Labrador, R., and D. Renwick. “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.” Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2018, Backgrounder edition. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.

[4] “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment.” U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accessed November 16, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment.

[5] Bier, David. 2018. “0.1% of Border Patrol Arrests Are MS-13.” https://www.cato.org/blog/01-border-patrol-arrests-are-ms-13.

[6] Vaughan. n.d. “MS-13 Resurgence: Immigration Enforcement Needed to Take Back Our Streets.” Center for Immigration Studies. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://cis.org/Report/MS13-Resurgence-Immigration-Enforcement-Needed-Take-Back-Our-Streets.

New Policy Brief: The New Generation—Mexico’s Emerging Organized Crime Threat

Posted on March 19, 2018June 7, 2019 by dshirk

03/19/18 (written by dshirk) – Over the past decade, more than 200,000 people have been murdered in Mexico, including the record 29,000 murders that occurred in 2017 alone. According to a new Justice in Mexico policy brief by Lucy La Rosa and David A. Shirk, the recent increase in violence is one of the unintended consequences of the Mexican government’s strategy to target top organized crime figures for arrest and extradition. In the policy brief, titled “The New Generation: Mexico’s Emerging Organized Crime Threat,” the authors contend that the “kingpin strategy” that led to the downfall of famed drug trafficker Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán has now given rise to a new organized crime syndicate known as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG).

The authors provide a detailed history of the CJNG, an offshoot of the Milenio and Sinaloa Cartels. As recounted in the new report, the CJNG has managed to re-brand itself, consolidate splintered criminal networks, and emerge as one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Based in Guadalajara, the capital of the state of Jalisco, the CJNG has a widespread and growing presence that authorities say spans two thirds of the country. The CJNG is headed by Ruben “El Mencho” Oseguera, a small time drug trafficker who was convicted in California, deported to Mexico, and emerged as a ruthless and shrewd drug cartel leader.

The authors contend that the CJNG offers a timely case study of how organized crime groups adapt following the disruption of leadership structures, and the limits of the so-called “kingpin” strategy to combat organized crime, which has contributed to the splintering, transformation, and diversification of Mexican organized crime groups and a shift in drug trafficking into new product areas, including heroin, methamphetamines, and other synthetic drugs.

The authors offer three main policy recommendations. First, the authors argue that U.S. State Department and their Mexican partners must continue working earnestly to bolster the capacity of Mexican law enforcement to conduct long-term, wide-reaching criminal investigations and more effective prosecutions targeting not only drug kingpins but all levels of a criminal enterprise, including corrupt politicians and private sector money laundering operations. Second, the authors argue that U.S. authorities must work more carefully when returning convicted criminals back to Mexico, since deported criminal offenders like CJNG leader Oseguera are prime candidates to join the ranks of Mexican organized crime. Third, and finally, the authors contend that further drug policy reforms are urgently needed to properly regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of not only marijuana but also more potent drugs, including cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.

New Working Paper: Organized Crime and Violence in Baja California Sur

Posted on February 16, 2018March 16, 2018 by Ashley Ashley Ahrens-Viquez

Spatial distribution of homicides in BCS in 2017. Source: SNSP, 2017. Map generated by Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira

02/16/18 (written by Genesis Lopez) – A new Justice in Mexico working paper by Laura Y. Calderón, entitled Organized Crime and Violence in Baja California Sur, provides analysis on the elevated levels of violence directly impacting key Baja California Sur cities, Los Cabos and La Paz. Utilizing the latest information and statistics on this topic, Calderón found that much of the violence in Baja California Sur is linked to organized crime groups looking to control these key drug trafficking areas. The working paper further discusses the increase in violence linked to organized crime group rivalries and subsequent government action in these affected regions.

According to Calderón, Baja California Sur’s economy depends heavily on tourism and commerce. Historically, Baja California Sur is characterized by having some of the lowest rates of crime and violence in Mexico. The recent surge in violent crime over the last decade is connected to the region’s transformation into an important nexus for drug traffic operations in Mexico.

Since 2010, the Sinaloa Cartel has dominated the Baja California region- formally headed by drug trafficker, Joaquín “El Chápo” Guzmán. Guzmán’s organization looked to remove other competing organized crime groups in the region. Their success in consolidating a territory monopoly caused a drop in violence while opening their access to the U.S. market. The arrest and extradition of Guzmán caused a significant shift in the structure of Sinaloa, initiating internal competition between regional Sinaloan leaders. Additionally, with major kingpins like Guzmán being targeted by Mexican authorities, other cartels in the area took this as an opportunity to gain power. A new organized crime group called the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (Jalisco New Generation Cartel, CJNG), headed by Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes is rapidly becoming the main competitor to the Sinaloa Cartel.

In response to the increased violence, Mexican authorities deployed soldiers to Los Cabos and La Paz in an attempt to lower the rates of homicides through military presence in important hotspots. This deterrence tactic required the cooperation of municipal, state, and federal forces. However, local law enforcement is often under-trained and minimally equipped to meet the challenge presented by organized crime. Overall, the militarization approach has not proven to be successful.

Calderón posits that the recent violence seen in Baja California Sur could be linked to the spillover effect from other violent states nearby. According to scholars, Miming Pan, Benjamin Widner and Carl E. Enomoto, negative economic growth of one state exacts a consequence on neighboring states, causing the crime rates to increase. Although the Sinaloa cartel continues to hold dominance over almost the entire state, excluding the contested cities of La Paz and Los Cabos, there is a strong internal struggle over the lack of partnerships and centralized leadership for the organization. Moreover, the increasing prominence of the CJNG continues to challenge Sinaloa for the largest, operating organized crime group in Mexico.

Given the salient information presented in Calderón’s working paper, it is important to note that most of the violence happening in Baja California Sur is amongst individuals involved in organized crime. Tourists should exercise caution, but also keep in mind that the number of tourists of being targeted is currently low. Meanwhile, Mexican authorities in Baja California Sur, including local law enforcement and public officials, must be willing to engage in transparent and informed dialogue. Collaboration will be key to protecting the general citizenry and tourist flows, an important source of revenue to the state of Baja California Sur.

Sources

Pan, M., Widner, B. and Enomoto, C. E. (2012), GROWTH AND CRIME IN CONTIGUOUS STATES OF MEXICO. Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies, vol 24: p 51–64.