“Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013” now available

DVM_14The Justice in Mexico Project (JMP) based at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of San Diego is pleased to announce the publication of “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013.” Thanks to the generous funding of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, this is the project’s fifth annual report providing a detailed analysis of the problem of crime and violence in Mexico, which has been a major preoccupation for both policymakers and ordinary people in Mexico, as well as a shared concern for the U.S. government and its citizens. Justice in Mexico’s annual reports have compiled the latest available data and analysis to evaluate problems of crime and violence related to drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. These reports are especially intended to inform a U.S. and English language audience, since international news media coverage of Mexico tends to be fleeting and gravitates toward sporadic, sensationalistic incidents rather than the analysis of broader issues and longer-term trends.

This year’s study builds on past findings and seeks to provide new insights into Mexico’s recent security situation. The authors draw on the latest available data from multiple sources, with a primary emphasis on the first year in office for Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). In contrast to his predecessor, Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), President Peña Nieto appeared to deliberately downplay Mexico’s security problems, as well as his administration’s efforts to address them during the last year. However, as the authors discuss, crime and violence associated with organized crime remains a very serious problem in Mexico. Despite some definitive and much needed improvements in certain parts of the country, the overall security situation in Mexico remains much worse today than a decade ago and major improvements are still urgently needed.

The report is broken down into four sections: (1) Why violence in Mexico matters; (2) “Drug violence”: definitions, data, and methodologies; (3) Findings: drug violence in Mexico; and (4) Analysis and developments in 2013. Some of the study’s most important results and conclusions include that the total number of homicides in Mexico appears to have declined by 15% in 2013, although rates of kidnapping and extortion have significantly increased. It also found that between one third and two thirds of all homicides in Mexico in 2013 were attributed to organized crime groups, and that less violence in Mexico’s northern states have increased the spotlight on Pacific coastal states. The report looks at the Peña Nieto administration’s achievements and preoccupations since taking office in 2012, including an analysis of the government’s continued kingpin strategy, use of the military in the security strategy, and the current challenge of the dynamic situation in the state of Michoacán involving official forces, organized crime groups, and self-defense groups (grupos de autodefensa).

“Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013” was co-authored by Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk.

To read the full report, click here.

Veracruz state police officers implicated in kidnapping and murder of musician

Gibrán David Martiz Díaz performing on "La Voz de México." Photo: Noticias Televisa.

Gibrán David Martiz Díaz performing on “La Voz de México.” Photo: Noticias Televisa.

1/29/14 – (by cmolzahn) – The government of Javier Duarte in Veracruz is now acknowledging that state police officers were involved in the kidnapping and murder of a participant in “La Voz de México” (Mexican version of TV contest The Voice) singer Gibrán David Martiz Díaz. This position contradicts Governor Duarte’s initial position, rejecting Martiz’s father’s claims that police officers were responsible for his son’s death. The high-profile case is just the latest in a string of accusations—some from within the Veracruz state security apparatus—that members of the state’s elite police force are engaged in kidnappings, forced disappearances, and torture.

Martiz, 22 years old and with Mexican and Panama citizenships, disappeared on January 7, along with his friend Sergio Martínez, having been reportedly kidnapped by armed men outside Martiz’s apartment in the city of Xalapa, which he had just moved into the day before. Their bodies were found four days later following a supposed confrontation between Veracruz state police officers and armed criminals in the Huatusco municipality. Initial reports from the Veracruz Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado, PGJE) said that weaponry, fake state police uniforms, and drugs were found at the site. Two presumed criminals were reported killed in the confrontation, and were initially blamed for the kidnappings. Gibrán’s father, Efraín, claimed from the beginning that his son had been apprehended by state police officers, and went to the offices of the state’s Public Security Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, SSP) for information about his son, but was told that there was none, despite eight witnesses and photographs concurring that Gibrán and his friend were detained by state patrol #201778.

The day following the positive identification of Gibrán’s body, photographs of him posing with high-caliber weapons were circulated anonymously on the El Blog del Narco and Notiinfomex websites. Hours later the same photographs were distributed through email addresses that have been linked with Governor Duarte’s press office. Efraín Martíz said that the photos were for a promotional video for his son’s album in production, “Playboy,” and had been taken from his phone, which would have been in the possession of Veracruz police. On January 13, the day following the Veracruz government’s announcement that the bodies of the singer and his friend were found in a stolen vehicle following a chase and ensuing shootout with presumed criminals, Efraín Martiz publicly blamed state police for his son’s death. Social media erupted the same day under the hashtag #DondeEstáGibrán?, with hundreds taking to Twitter to demand that the case be properly investigated.

In a press conference the same day, Attorney General Amadeo Flores did an about-face, admitting to the participation of seven agents of the state’s Policía Estatal Acreditable, a specialized police force with military training whose agents are supposed to have undergone a rigorous battery of vetting examinations. Flores said that the seven agents were facing charges of breach of official duties, coercion and abuse of authority. He did not, however, clarify what their exact roles in Martiz’s kidnapping were, nor did he release the names of the seven officers, who are currently in custody. He also did not address why just a day earlier state authorities had denied any police involvement in the crimes.

Veracruz has prided itself in the progress it has made compared to other states in developing the police force. Last October, though, an official in the state’s Public Security Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, SSP) reported that she had been detained, handcuffed, blindfolded, and then beaten and tortured by officers of the state’s Policía Acreditable. The ten-year veteran of the SSP’s highway patrol, Jacqueline Espejo Moctezuma, said that four masked police officers apprehended her as she left work, forced her into a taxi, and took her to the El Lencero police academy facility, where she was held for four days. She claimed that the officers insisted that she accept charges of marijuana possession, and threatened her and her family if she did not.

Upon returning to SSP offices, she reported what had happened to her, and was immediately transferred to the Panuco municipality to carry out patrols on the orders of Arturo Bermúdez Zurita, head of the Veracruz SSP. For Espejo, the message of the transfer was clear: “They send me to Panuco [the area within her command zone most affected by drug trafficking]. In my ten years as an official I was in the highway sector, but administrative. It’s been almost seven years since I’ve used a gun, they send me there so I don’t return, not with [my] life,” she said. At her press conference, she showed visible signs of physical trauma, and her medical exams revealed a deviated trachea, as well as inflammation of some internal organs. Espejo’s alleged unlawful detention followed one year after similar allegations from Diario AZ reporter Carlos Hernández that he was arrested, detained and beaten by agents of the Policía Estatal Acreditable at the same facility as Espejo. Two days later, he was turned over to federal prosecutors under drug possession charges, but was released 12 hours later due to a lack of evidence.

Sources:

 

Zavaleta, Noé. “Acusan a policías de Veracruz de cometer desapariciones forzadas.” Proceso. October 18, 2013.

Ávila, Édgar and Rodrigo Barranco. “Hallan muerto a joven cantante de ‘La Voz.’” El Universal. January 20, 2014.

“Incriminan a agentes estatales en levantón y muerte de Gibrán Martiz.” El Diario. January 21, 2014.

Zavaleta, Noé. “El caso Gibrán, otro escándalo del gobierno veracruzano.” Proceso. January 25, 2014.

The Peña Nieto administration: a year in review

01/02/14 – (by cmolzahn) During his campaign and the initial stages of his presidency, President Enrique Peña Nieto promised Mexicans a change in the government’s organized crime strategy, pledging a more creative, less improvisational approach to the ongoing security crisis in certain areas of the country. Nevertheless, his administration has reacted to the worsening public security situation particularly in the Pacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero with a 50% increase in soldiers deployed to carry out public security forces, with several municipalities currently under the control of the Mexican armed forces. According to a report in La Jornada, the 50% increase in soldiers deployed along with a 20% increase in Federal Police (Policía Federal, PF) agents involved in public security operations have not translated to a significant decrease in organized crime activity.

President Enrique Peña Nieto (right) takes office in December 2012 from former President Felipe Calderón (left). Photo: Wikimedia Commons

President Enrique Peña Nieto (right) takes office in December 2012 from former President Felipe Calderón (left). Photo: Wikimedia Commons

While official data points to a decrease in homicides in 2013 as compared with the previous year, rates of extortions and kidnappings are up in 2013 as compared with 2012. Between December 2012 and October 2013 there were 7,300 complaints of extortion, 606 more than during the same period a year prior. Moreover, Mexico’s National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP) reported that during the first eleven months of 2013 there were 1,583 kidnappings reported to state attorney general’s offices, up from 1,196 during the same period in 2012, representing a 32% increase. The states with the highest incidence of kidnapping in 2013 have been Guerrero, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, Morelos, the State of Mexico (Estado de México, Edomex), Veracruz and Tabasco. Of these, Guerrero reported the greatest increase in kidnappings, surging from 69 reported cases in 2012 to 228 during 2013.

In November 2012, Peña Nieto presented his organized crime strategy, which was to involve dividing the country into five regions and the creation of specialized police units to address security issues particular to individual regions, but this proposal has yet to materialize. He also proposed the creation of a National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional), a police force of 40,000 soldiers from the Army (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) and Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR) but with a civilian command, dedicated exclusively to combating crime in the municipalities, which have proven most susceptible to corruption by organized crime groups. The intention was for the Gendarmerie to eventually replace the Mexican armed forces in the public security role they have acquired during the past two presidential administrations. In his first meeting with the National Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad), however, Peña Nieto announced that the corporation would be launched with 10,000 agents. In June, the initial police body was further scaled back to 5,000, none of which will be soldiers, likely because of resistance from the Mexican armed forces to relinquish highly trained soldiers. Recruits must pass a rigorous series of physical, psychological and confidence exams, which, while universally accepted as a positive, makes finding qualified individuals outside of the armed forces particularly challenging. Moreover, it was revealed that despite initial proposals, the Gendarmerie would be made an additional division of the Federal Police, as opposed to an autonomous agency. The initial contingent of the Gendarmerie is scheduled to be fully operational in July 2014, though Public Security Secretary (Comisionado Nacional de Seguridad) Manuel Mondragón y Kalb announced in December that agents are already operating in tourist areas of Acapulco, the city of Puebla, and Monterrey, as well as several municipalities in the State of Mexico and the Federal District (Distrito Federal, DF).

Eduardo Guerrero, director of public policy consulting group Lantia Consultores, said that the National Gendarmerie was launched without a clear idea of what they would accomplish, a fact he considers unfortunate given the need for a stronger state presence in the rural municipalities. Guerrero believes that in order to be effective, the force must be oriented toward preventing crime, for which the proposed number of agents will be insufficient. Moreover, the federal budget allocated just $4.5 billion pesos ($344 million USD) for the Gendarmerie for 2014, less than 10% of that allocated to the Mexican Army, and roughly 18% of the Navy’s share.

Guerrero’s lack of confidence in the government’s methodology is shared by many Mexicans. According to polling firm Consulta Mitofsky, Peña Nieto had the lowest approval rating entering office (54%) since Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 (42%). His approval rating has since fallen to 49.7%, also the lowest after a year of presidency since Zedillo (43.3%). This low perception of both the security situation in Mexico and of the government’s willingness or ability to confront it has resulted in an unprecedented wave of vigilante groups, particularly in the Pacific states of Guerrero and Michoacán. As a result, 47 of Michoacán’s 113 municipalities have felt the presence of such groups, with their presence continuing to spread, despite the state and federal governments’ continued insistence that they would not. Eduardo Guerrero said that a force like the Gendarmerie adequately staffed and funded and properly implemented will be required to gain the public trust and counter the presence of such groups, and estimates that it will take between eight and 12 months to create the ties with communities necessary to evaluate and respond to their specific security challenges.

Despite these setbacks, the Peña Nieto administration can claim some success during its first full calendar year. Through November, the official number of intentional homicides during Peña Nieto’s tenure was 18,454, down from 21,728 cases from December 2011 through November 2012, a 15% decline. It must be noted, though, that homicides were already in decline during the final months of the Calderón administration; between October 2012 and October 2013 there was a decline of just 3.2%, while the decline in the monthly average of homicides during the last four months of 2012 (which includes one month of Peña Nieto’s administration) and all of 2013 was less than 1%. It is also important to point out that 2012’s numbers were revised upward in May of 2013, as will likely be the case for 2013’s data. Moreover, this spring the Mexican government made the decision to stop differentiating organized crime-related homicides, making it difficult to accurately gauge success in that arena. In the fight against organized crime, several high-profile arrests have been made under Peña Nieto’s watch, including Javier Torres Félix and Manuel Aguirre Galindo of the Arellano Félix cartel; and Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales, leader of the Zetas criminal organization. Also arrested during Peña Nieto’s first year were Mario Armando Ramírez Treviño, leader of the Gulf Cartel; and Marcelino Ticante Castro, considered one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s highest-ranking members. Nevertheless, overall organized crime-related arrests are down nearly 33% from 2012.

According to a document the Attorney Genera’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) submitted to the Associated Press, recent anti-cartel efforts have dealt the biggest blow to the Zetas criminal organization. It also details 12 separate drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico, including several little-known groups, such as the Cartel del Poniente, and the La Corona and Los Rojos criminal organizations. The AP requested the document detailing cartel leaders sought after, captured or killed during the Peña Nieto administration. After losing an appeal before the Federal Institute for Access to Information and Protection of Data (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos, IFAI), the Mexican government turned the document over, though omitted the names of the 53 capos from the list of 122 still being sought after. Of the 69 cartel leaders captured, Los Zetas were by far the hardest hit, suffering 23 arrested and four killed. This focus on the Zetas was consistent with former President Calderón’s priorities, and comes as no shock to security experts. “It doesn’t surprise me, since the final two years of the Calderón government, the Mexican government focused on combating Los Zetas, which are the most violent against the population in general,” said Jorge Chabat, security and organized crime expert at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE). The second most-impacted group was the Cártel del Poniente, which operates primarily in the northern states of Coahuila and Durango. 17 of its members were detained. The Sinaloa Cartel led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán followed with seven arrests and two killed.

Security analysts Rodrigo Salazar of the Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Flasco) and César Velázquez of the Iberian-American University (Universidad Iberoamericana) agree that despite his campaign promises, there has been no significant change in public security strategy between the administrations of former President Calderón and Peña Nieto, both of which center around the use of the military to respond to organized crime activity. Both analysts commented that the most notable change has been a shift in discourse, with the Peña Nieto administration addressing organized crime violence much less in the media than that of Calderón who, according to Salazar, had a communications strategy “centered in the war [against drug trafficking],” which he characterizes as “one of Calderón’s most dramatic errors.”

Sources:

 

Meyer, Maureen and Clay Boggs. “One Year into Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s Administration.” Washington Office in Latin America. November 27, 2013.

“Analistas ‘reprueban’ año de Peña en seguridad y economía.” EFE. December 1, 2013.

“Con Peña Nieto aumentó en 50% el número de soldados que realizan tareas contra el narco: investigación.” Sinembargo. December 1, 2013.

Martín, Rubén. “Peña Nieto un año: reformas y crisis social.” El Economista. December 6, 2013.

Hope, Alejandro. “¿Menos homicidios?” Animal Político.
December 18, 2013.

“Los Zetas, el cártel más golpeado con Peña Nieto: PGR.” Proceso. December 19, 2013.

Baptista, Diana. “Bajan 15% homicidios con Peña.” Reforma.
December 20, 2013.

Aguilar, Andro. “Mantienen Gendarmería en limbo.” El Norte
December 22, 2013.

 “La extorsión en México también repunta en el primer año de gobierno de Peña Nieto.” Sinembargo. December 23, 2013.

 “Gendarmería opera ‘de facto’ desde estas vacaciones: Mondragón y Kalb.” Vanguardia. December 23, 2013.

Contreras, José. “Qué lío con la Gendarmería.” La Crónica de Hoy. December 26, 2013.

Muedano, Marcos and Silvia Otero. “Secuestros aumentan 32% en México: Segob.” El Universal. December 28, 2013.

Outright leader of the Gulf Cartel captured

Mario Armando Ramírez Treviño “X-20” or “El Pelón.” Image: SEGOB.

Mario Armando Ramírez Treviño “X-20” or “El Pelón.” Image: SEGOB.

08/21/13 – The alleged leader of the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo, CDG), Mario Armando Ramírez Treviño, known as “X-20” or “El Pelón,” was captured by members of the Mexican Army (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) on August 17, 2013, in the border city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, just miles away from McAllen, Texas. According to information from the Mexican government, the capture of 24 members of the CDG on August 12 led to Ramírez Treviño’s arrest. SEDENA also captured El Pelón’s personal bodyguards, Pedro Cruz Barrios and Gerardo López Ruíz, as well as large weapons and almost $40,000 (USD), $25,000 pesos, and 11 golden coins.

Ramírez Treviño–believed to be the outright leader of the CDG–gained control of the organization by eliminating most of his rivals within the CDG.  El Pelón was allegedly trying to unify the cartel after a split following the death of Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén, “Tony Tormenta,” in 2010. As explained by Justice in Mexico, when “Tony Tormenta” was killed in 2010, the organization divided into two factions, one led by Jorge Eduardo Costilla, “El Coss,”—captured on September 12, 2013—better known as “Los Metros,” and the other by Cárdenas Guillén’s sibling Mario—captured on September 3, 2012—, better known as “Los Rojos.” Based on information by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the leadership of the CDG will hereafter be allegedly disputed by Luis Alberto Trinidad Cerón, “El Güicho,” Juan Francisco Carrizales, “El 98,” and Juan Alberto de la Cruz Álvarez, “El Juanillo” or “El Fernandillo.”

The CDG formed in the 1970s and is considered one of the oldest criminal organizations in Mexico. Its founder, Juan Nepomuceno Guerra, was among the first generation of drug traffickers along with Miguel Ángel Felix Gallardo, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, “Don Neto,” and Rafael Caro Quintero. (Read more about Caro Quintero’s controversial release from prison this month after a federal judge found him wrongfully prosecuted). Juan Nepomucena Guerra gave control of the CDG to his nephew, Juan García Ábrego, who was arrested in 1996 and later extradited to the United States. Osiel Cárdenas Guillén then took control of the organization until his capture and extradition in 2005, at which point his brother, Tony Tormenta, became the outright CDG leader until he was killed in 2010.

El Pelón is considered one of the main perpetrators of extreme violence in the state of Tamaulipas, responsible for both ordering attacks with firearms and explosives against Mexican law enforcement agencies, as well as serving as the mastermind behind several kidnappings.

Sources:

“Ramírez Treviño, el capo que lideró el cártel del Golfo eliminando rivales.” CNN México. August 17, 2013.

“Mensaje del Subsecretario de Normatividad de Medios de la Secretaría de Gobernación y Vocero del Gabinete de Seguridad del Gobierno de la República, Eduardo Sánchez Hernández, en torno a la captura de Mario Armando Ramírez Treviño.” Secretaría de Gobernación. August 18, 2013.

Santaeulalia, inés and Quesada, Juan Diego. “Cae el líder del cartel del Golfo.” El País. August 18, 2013.

“Ni un tiro en la detención de ‘El Pelón’, líder del cártel del Golfo.” ABC. August 19, 2013.

Redacción. “Los herederos del Cártel del Golfo.” El Universal. August 20, 2013.

“Godfather” of Mexican drug trafficking released from prison

Rafael Caro Quintero. Photo: DEA International Fugitives.

Rafael Caro Quintero. Photo: DEA International Fugitives.

08/12/13 – Rafael Caro Quintero (61), one of the most important kingpins in Mexican history and once considered one of the godfathers of drug trafficking, was released on Friday, August 9, from the Puente Grande prison after serving 28 years for the kidnapping, torture, and killing of undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in 1985. Caro Quintero was originally captured in San José, Costa Rica in 1985 during an operation launched by the DEA after he allegedly fled from Mexico with support from Mexican authorities.

Originally sentenced to serve 40 years in prison, Caro Quintero’s early release came after a federal judge found him wrongfully prosecuted and tried by federal authorities for the killing of Kiki Camarena. According to the judge, the sentencing by a federal court was in breach of Mexican law because the DEA agent was acting undercover with no diplomatic or consular status; hence the crime was a regular homicide under state jurisdiction and the federal courts had no authority to prosecute and try the case. Caro Quintero was acquitted of other charges against him and already served the time in prison for the only other crime he was originally found guilty of—drug production and trafficking.

Caro Quintero, who once offered to pay the Mexican foreign debt if released from prison, is one of the founders—along with Miguel Ángel Felix Gallardo, and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo “Don Neto”—of the Guadalajara Cartel, the most powerful criminal organization in Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s. Known as the first generation of Mexican drug traffickers, after the arrest of the “Godfathers” the Guadalajara Cartel split into new organizations—the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juarez Cartel, and the Tijuana Cartel—that grew to be the most powerful during the 1990s and after.

The kidnapping and killing of Kiki Camarena was allegedly planned and executed by Caro Quintero in coordination with Felix Gallardo and Don Neto after DEA investigations led to a major bust of the “El Búfalo” ranch in Chihuahua in 1984. The operation that led to the seizure of around 1,000 hectares of mariguana plantations allegedly cost Caro Quintero—owner of the ranch—around $8 billion (USD). Kiki Camarena was kidnapped on February 7, 1985, along with his Mexican pilot, Alfredo Avelar, in Guadalajara in the state of Jalisco. Both victims were tortured and killed, and their bodies found almost a month later in the neighboring state of Michoacán. After pressure from the U.S. Government, Caro Quintero was arrested in Costa Rica on April 4, 1985; Don Neto in Puerto Vallarta on April 7, 1985; and Felix Gallardo in Guadalajara on April 8, 1989. These operations also led to the arrest of almost 100 police officers from municipal and state agencies, as well as from the Federal Direction of Security (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS) and the Judicial Federal Police (Policía Judicial Federal, PJF). The three kingpins then accused each other of being responsible for the killing of Camarena.

After the DEA murder, a period of tension rose between the United States and Mexico. U.S. authorities denounced the corruption of Mexican security agencies such as the DFS and the PJF, at the same time that U.S. authorities were conducting operations in breach of Mexican sovereignty, such as the abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain who was prosecuted in the United States for assisting in Kiki Camarena’s torture. Although Alvarez Machain was acquitted, his case before U.S. courts later became an important precedent for international jurisdiction. It is believed that the pressure by the United States not only led to the capture of the Guadalajara Cartel leaders, but also to the dismantling of the DFS—the political police of the Mexican government—, which was formally dismantled in May 1985 after its involvement the year before in the planning and murder of award-winning Mexican journalist Manuel Buendía.

As reported by the Justice in Mexico Project, there has been a recent chill in security cooperation between Mexico and the United States, and the release of Caro Quintero has been perceived as a significant setback to Mexico in its war against organized crime. The DEA said it was “deeply troubled” and “extremely disappointed” by the Mexican court’s decision and immediately placed Caro Quintero at the top of the most wanted international criminals. The agency announced that it will seek the extradition of Caro Quintero to be prosecuted in the United States after an initial petition was denied by Mexican authorities. According to international media, the release could potentially raise new “tensions” between the two governments, though Mexican authorities suggested an eventual extradition could be granted if their U.S. counterparts are able to substantiate the request.

Sources:

EFE. “Detenido Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, jefe de la ‘mafia’ de la droga Mexicana.” El País. April 11, 1985.

Rohter, Larry. “Mexicans arrest top drug figure and 80 policemen.” New York Times. April 11, 1989.

Justice in Mexico Project. “Chill in bi-lateral collaboration over security.” News Monitor Vol. 8, No. 4. April – July, 2013.

Associated Press. “Mexico drug kingpin Caro Quintero ordered released on appeal after 28 years.” Washington Post. August 9, 2013.

“El narcotraficante Rafael Caro Quintero queda libre tras obtener un amparo.” CNN México. August 9, 2013.

Castillo, Gustavo. “Absolvió tribunal a Caro Quintero de asociación delictuosa: Judicatura.” La Jornada. August 9, 2013.

SINEMBARGO. “Advierte prensa extranjera nueva tensión México-EU.” Noreste. August 10, 2013.

Associated Press. “U.S. furious over freeing of Mexican drugs baron Rafael Caro Quintero.” The Guardian. August 10, 2013.

Carrasco Arizaga, Jorge. “Una cadena de fallas puso en la calle a Caro Quintero.” Proceso. August 10, 2013.

Esquivel, J. Jesús. “Pasada la sorpresa, el gobierno, dispuesto a la extradición.” Proceso. August 10, 2013.