Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security arrested in Texas

Former Secretary of Public Security giving a speech during his tenure. Photo: The Associated Press, Alexandre Meneghini.
Former Secretary of Public Security giving a speech during his tenure. Photo: The Associated Press, Alexandre Meneghini.

12/19/19 (written by kheinle) — Mexico’s former Secretary of Public Security, Genaro García Luna, was arrested in Dallas, Texas on Monday, December 9. According to The Los Angeles Times, he is thought to be the highest ranking Mexican official ever to be charged with drug trafficking in the United States. He served as Mexico’s Secretary of Public Security (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, SSP) from 2006 to 2012 during the Calderón Administration. Prior to that, he led Mexico’s Federal Investigation Agency (Agencia Federal de Investigación, AFI) from 2001 to 2005 during the Fox Administration.

Four-Count Charge

The indictment against García Luna was unsealed on December 10 in the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Eastern District of New York, leveling three counts of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and one count of making false statements in his U.S. citizenship application. With the former secretary’s protection, the Sinaloa Cartel was able to safely import tons of cocaine and other drugs into the United States between 2006 and 2012. The indictment specifically alleges that García Luna:

  1. “…[conspired] to distribute a controlled substance, intending, knowing and having reasonable cause to believe that such substance would be lawfully imported into the United States from a place outside thereof, which offense involved a substance containing cocaine…”
  2. “…[conspired] to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more controlled substances, which offense involved a substance containing cocaine…”
  3. “…[conspired] to import a controlled substance into the United States from a place outside thereof, which offense involved a substance containing cocaine…”
  4. “…[made] one or more materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representations, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United States…”

Systemic Corruption

García Luna’s arrest is emblematic of the serious challenges facing Mexico. The country is notorious for its inability – in some cases unwillingness – to curtail corruption, to check the extremely high levels of impunity, and to hold elected officials accountable. In García Luna’s case, as Secretary of Public Security from 2006 to 2012, he was “the man considered to be the brains behind the Mexican government’s militarized war on drug traffickers,” writes The New York Times. According to the indictment, however, on two occasions García Luna received briefcases full of cash from the Sinaloa Cartel totaling USD $3 million and USD $5 million. Thus, he was simultaneously receiving millions of dollars in exchange for protecting the Sinaloa Cartel and allowing it to operate with impunity while leading the government’s “tough on crime” security plan targeting the Sinaloa Cartel, among others.

In hind sight, García Luna undermined his own strategy. “We are obligated to confront crime,” he said in an interview in 2008 discussing the potential to negotiate with cartels. “That is our job, that is our duty, and we will not consider a pact.”

Funds Received

This indictment unveiled in the Eastern District of New York also sheds some light on the previously unaccounted for growth in García Luna’s personal wealth, as detailed by El Universal. “According to official numbers, García Luna’s salary increase[d] by 120% and his assets increased their value five times.” In 2002, the former secretary earned MXN $1.7 million in 2002, but then jumped to MXN $3.7 million in 2008. He and his wife also owned two homes valued around MXN $500,000 each in 2002, but then owned a MXN $7.5 million-home in 2008 worth more than seven times that his two properties combined just six years earlier. They then purchased two homes just four years later in 2012 in Florida valued at USD $5.5 million combined. There have long been questions surrounding García Luna’s ability to purchase such luxury homes; the indictment may help fill in these gaps.

A Step Forward

With the blatant show of corruption on display in García Luna’s indictment, his arrest is being applauded. “García Luna stands accused of taking millions of dollars in bribes from ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán’s Sinaloa Cartel while [García Luna] controlled Mexico’s Federal Police Force and was responsible for ensuring public safety in Mexico,” wrote U.S. Attorney Richard Donoghue. His “arrest demonstrates our resolve to bring to justice those who help cartels inflict devastating harm on the United States and Mexico, regardless of the positions they held while committing their crimes.”

If convicted, García Luna faces between ten years and life in prison. Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la República, FGR) is also working with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, SRE) to extradite García Luna to face charges in Mexico.

Sources:

Indictment. CR 19-576. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. December 4, 2019.

Espino, Manuel. “FGR solicitará extradición de Genaro García Luna.” El Universal. December 10, 2019.

Gringlas, Sam. “Former Top Mexican Security Official Arrested On Cocaine Trafficking Charges.” National Public Radio. December 10, 2019.

Linthicum, Kate. “Former Mexican security official arrested in U.S., accused of taking millions in bribes from ‘El Chapo.’” The Los Angeles Times. December 10, 2019.

Press Release. “Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Arrested for Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements.” Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York. December 10, 2019.

Semple, Kirk and Paulina Villegas. “Arrest of Top Crime Fights Stuns Mexico, Where Corruption Is All Too Routine.” The New York Times. December 11, 2019.

Zavala, Susana. “Genaro García Luna inexplicably built a fortune in 6 years.” El Universal. December 12, 2019.

Nine Members of Local Mormon Family Killed in Cartel-Related Ambush in Mexico

One of the vehicles seen here, torched from the ambush. Photo: Meghan Dhaliwal, The New York Times.

11/22/19 (written by T McGinnis) On November 4, 2019, nine members of a local Mormon family were killed in a cartel-related ambush in northeastern Sonora. Among the deceased, officials found and identified the bodies of three women and their six children, all belonging to the LeBarón family.

Ambushed en Route

According to El Universal and The Wall Street Journal, at 10:00am on the morning of November 4, the mothers and 14 of their children left their homes in the small village of La Mora in three separate vehicles. Two of the vehicles were traveling to the neighboring state of Chihuahua , while the third was headed to Phoenix, Arizona, all to visit family. Witness accounts from affected family members who survived say that around 10:20am, one of the SUVs was discovered engulfed in flames. Three armed men were seen fleeing the scene.

About 40 minutes later, closer to 11:00am, the other two SUVs were attacked ten miles further down the road. One of the vehicles contained Christina Marie Langford and her seven-month-old baby. The other was driven Dawna Ray Langford and her seven children. Dawna’s 13-year-old son, Devin, survived the ambush along with several of his other siblings. After fleeing the attack and hiding in bushes along the roadside, the surviving children then walked 14 miles back into La Mora to alert authorities.

Suspects Behind the Massacre

The attacks were the result of a clash between rival gangs in the surrounding area. General Homero Mendoza Ruiz, the Chief of Staff for Mexico’s National Defense, said that two criminal groups had previously engaged in a shootout along the U.S.-Mexico border in the town of Agua Prieta. They were identified as Los Salazar, based in the state of Sonora, and La Línea, based in the neighboring state of Chihuahua. The New York Times thenreported that in an effort to create barriers of entry for Los Salazar, La Línea had dispatched gunman to the region that straddles Sonora and Chihuahua, which is where the attacks took place.  

Motives Involved

The motive behind the massacre has been debated. One theory is that it was a case of mistaken identity. General Mendoza noted that the suburban model of the SUV driven by two of the three mothers is commonly used by criminal gangs, which could have led to confusion about who was inside the vehicles. Additionally, investigators cited that because the children in one of the vehicles were allegedly able to flee, this suggests that the attack was not specifically directed toward the families.

Family and friends mourn the death of their loved ones following the November 4 attack. Photo: Meghan Dhaliwal, The New York Times.

Another theory, however, speculated that the LeBarón family was somehow more intimately entangled and actively engaged in the rivalry. Even some family members themselves said that what transpired on November 4 was most likely a targeted, intentional operation by criminal groups. According to Milenio, Julián LeBarón, the cousin of a victim, stated that although the community remains bewildered by the guiding motivations of the involved groups, there is no doubt that “they [were] intentionally murdered.”

Still, accounts differ with regard to the relationship between the Mormon community and local cartels. Some investigators suggested that the motive behind the attack may be linked to the community’s “cordial” relationship with Los Salazar criminal group, which controls most of the activity in that region. Los Salazar are thought to be aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel, headed by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán – a stringent enemy of La Línea. Some speculate that the ambush served as a message to the Sinaloa factions that La Línea, and more broadly the Juárez Cartel, control the road and therefore the drug trafficking routes that lead into the state of Chihuahua.

Mormon History in Northern Mexico

Although various news stories have portrayed the massacre as a violent attack against visiting U.S. citizens, the community of over 5,000 Mormons living in northern Mexico dates back to the early 20th century and consists of many dual nationals. According to El Universal, the LeBarón family initially made the move into Mexico to practice polygamy, a convention that since then, has largely faded out among members.

While some press accounts have focused on this aspect—including conspiracy theories attempting to link the victims’ families to the human trafficking ring known as NXIVM—others have focused on the family’s activism in advocating for the rights of crime victims and local disputes over land tenure and water. A decade earlier, two members of the LeBarón family were kidnapped and murdered following their confrontation of the drug gangs that control the borderlands south of Arizona. That incident spurred family members to organize locally and nationally to pressure the government to act to improve citizen security and victim protections.

U.S.-Mexico Relations

Source: The New York Times.

Though authorities are still working to identify possible suspects and uncovering the real motivations for the massacre, the implications for the U.S.-Mexico relationship remain much more evident. Since the attack occurred approximately 70 miles from the Arizona-Mexico border and against dual U.S.-Mexico citizens, U.S. politicians have become increasingly vocal regarding the security policy of Mexican President Andres Manuel López Obrador. According to The Wall Street Journal, U.S. President Donald Trump offered help in combating cartel violence. “This is the time for Mexico, with the help of the United States, to wage WAR on the drug cartels and wipe them off the face of the earth…the cartels have become so large and powerful that you sometimes need an army to defeat an army!” he tweeted. Given the historical legacy of U.S. interventionism in Mexico and apprehensions about armed U.S. agents operating in Mexico, President López Obrador swiftly declined the offer.

Jorge Chabat, an analyst at the University of Guadalajara, stated that this incident will likely “raise the temperature among conservative sectors in the U.S. precisely during election season.” Other political actors, such as U.S. Senator Ben Sasse (R., Neb.), have asserted that Mexico remains dangerously close to assuming the classification of a failed state, especially given the violence seen in Culiacán and Veracruz. “Mexico’s president hasn’t taken the threat seriously and innocent lives have been lost again.” He urged Mexico to heed President Trump’s advice and join U.S. military forces to launch a “full-scale offensive against these butchers.”

Trafficking at the U.S.-Mexico Border

Ironically, sources point out the underlying complicity of the U.S. in the recent violence targeting La Mora’s Mormon community. The New York Times reports that at a news conference two days after the attacks, Mexican government officials offered additional details regarding the incident. According to investigators, “the ammunition used in the attack were .223 caliber cartridges manufactured in the United States by Remington” and usually associated with AR-15 and M16 rifles. Each year, approximately 200,000 American guns illegally cross the border into Mexico, many of which land in the hands of the criminal organizations that fight to control the multibillion drug trade to the United States.

Since taking office, President Obrador has issued public statements signaling that his time in office would constitute the end of entrenched political corruption and Mexico’s “War on Drugs.” With Obrador’s strategy of “hugs, not bullets,” he discusses a prioritized focus on alleviating the poverty that drives individuals to join gangs and fall prey to cartel influence. However, record homicide rates in 2019 alone have caused many to call this strategy into question. To intensify an already escalated situation, the incident on November 4 happened only two weeks after the Sinaloa Cartel laid siege to the city of Culiacán following the military’s arrest of El Chapo’s son, Ovidio Guzmán. For many, the subsequent release of Guzmán and retreat of military forces signaled a weak government security strategy. María Elena Morera, director of civil society organization Causa in Común, told The Wall Street Journal that, “Mr. López Obrador’s strategy is clearly not working. He can’t keep thinking that a government using legitimate force against criminals is what generates violence.”

Next Steps

Mexico’s Secretary of Security and Civilian Protection Alfonso Durazo initially reported that a suspect had been brought into custody, but information later gathered indicated he was not involved. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the alleged request of the Mexican government, later agreed to join the investigation into the massacre. With internal and external pressures equally intensifying, it remains to be seen whether President López Obrador’s security strategy will evolve in the face of increased scrutiny and international political pressure.

Sources:

Belmont, José Antonio. “Familia LeBarón cree que ataque a mujeres y niños fue directo.” Milenio. November 5, 2019.

Kaleem, Jaweed. “La masacre de ciudadanos estadounidenses apunta a la comunidad mormona con profundas raíces en México.” Los Angeles Times. November 6, 2019.

Linthicum, Kate. “For Mexico ambush victims, there was no safety in numbers.” Los Angeles Times. November 6, 2019.

Santiago, Patricia Vélez. “Autoridades presumen que ataque a familia LeBarón en México se debió a lucha territorial entre dos grupos delictivos.” Univisión. November 6, 2019.

Ahmed, Azam. “After Mormon Family’s Terror in Mexico, a Message Emerges: No One Is Safe.” The New York Times. November 7, 2019.

Diaz, Lizbeth. “The LeBarón Case: Drug Cartels & the Fight to Control Drug Trafficking Routes.” El Universal. November 7, 2019.

Semple, Kirk. “Mormon Massacre in Mexico May Be Tied to Gang War, Officials Say.” The New York Times. November 8, 2019.

Ahmed, Azman. “9 Members of Mormon Family in Mexico Are Killed in Ambush.” The New York Times. November 8 2019.

Allyn, Bobby. “FBI Joins Investigation Into Killing Of 9 Members Of Mormon Family In Mexico.” NPR. November 11, 2019.

Kryt, Jeremy. “A New Twist in the Horrific Massacre of American Moms and Kids in Mexico.” The Daily Beast. November 11, 2019.

The Capture and Release of Ovidio Guzmán in Culiacán, Sinaloa

11/05/19 (Written by T McGinnis) – On October 17th, heavy fighting erupted in the Mexican city of Culiacán, Sinaloa after security forces detained Ovidio Guzmán López, the son of the jailed drug lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. According to El País, authorities initially reported that they found Guzmán during a routine search and arrested him due to the significant role he has played in his father’s illicit activities. However, as noted by the Los Angeles Times, the story evolved rapidly. Mexican officials later acknowledged that the operation had been planned, but suggested that it was physically carried out by rogue security forces without proper authorization. In either case, authorities lacked a search warrant upon entering Guzmán’s property, calling the legality of the mission into question from the beginning. Following this blunder, the cartel launched a large attack in retaliation. As videos and pictures of dead bodies and families scrambling for shelter surfaced and subsequently flooded the media, the public watched as the death toll gradually rose in the days following the violence. Univision later confirmed on October 21st that at least 13 people were killed and dozens more were injured.

According to Milenio, in reaction to the violence, authorities ultimately freed Ovidio Guzmán López and retreated, subsequently defending this course of action by arguing that the most important objective remains to avoid the loss of human lives. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador spoke publicly regarding the matter stating, “We don’t want bloodshed. We do not want that. From anyone. We are also hurting with respect to the loss of the life of an alleged criminal. We are not oblivious to the pain caused by the death of any person.” Reiterating the position that his administration has taken from the outset, Obrador insisted that “you can’t fight fire with fire.” However, this response raised strong criticisms of López Obrador’s security strategy, which thus far has failed to quell Mexico’s rising tide of violence, which has reached more than 3,000 murders each month as noted by El Universal.

Indeed, critics charged that the cartel’s victory represented a stunning “humiliation” for the Mexican government. According to The New York Times, though Obrador rightly maintains that he inherited the problem of unchecked corruption, those who oppose the strategy of release and retreat utilized by the government last month argue that these actions send the wrong message and set a dangerous precedent. Cartels may now more strongly assume that through the leveraging violence, they can get their way and further their interests. Additionally, while the López Obrador administration may opt not to go after drug traffickers, vocal critics like Ioan Grillo point out that the drug “war does not stop even if the government is not attacking them.”

López Obrador has also been criticized for the lack of an effective security strategy, despite his efforts to build a new National Guard to restore order. Indeed, many members of the National Guard have been diverted from their public security role to focus on stopping Central American migrants from entering the United States. Meanwhile, López Obrador’s efforts have been beset by protests from federal law enforcement officers who object to the dissolution of their agency, the Federal Police, and their incorporation into the National Guard during the recent reorganization of security forces, as noted last month by Justice in Mexico. Engelbert Ruiz, a Federal Police Officer, commented that “What is really happening is that they are simply changing our uniforms [with] no explanations, clarity, no rights or guarantees.”

According to the Diario de Yucatán, compounding an already complicated set of internal tensions, “Mexican media outlets reported that elements in the army were unhappy with the outcome of Thursday’s debacle in Culiacán.” As noted by sources, such as Mexican News Daily, this rift between President López Obrador and military forces continued to grow in the days following the operation. On October 22nd, retired military general Carlos Gaytán gave a highly critical speech regarding the worrisome status of “today’s Mexico” under the Obrador administration. “…We cannot ignore that the head of the executive has been legally and legitimately empowered. However, it’s also an undeniable truth that fragile counterweight mechanisms have permitted a strengthening of the executive, which has made strategic decisions that haven’t convinced everyone, to put it mildly.” Though Gaytán never explicitly referred to the Culiacán operation, established sources within the military informed The Washington Post that the speech served as a response to the mission on behalf the armed forces.

However, other sources point out that the story of Ovidio Guzmán’s release remains subject to two very different interpretations. According to Consulta Mitofsky for El Economista, “in Sinaloa, 79% of the population and 53% nationally, considered that the federal government did the right thing by freeing Ovidio Guzmán López from the threat of the Sinaloa Cartel to attack the citizens.” The state of Sinaloa, the cradle of Mexican drug trafficking, is overwhelmed by the presence of crime and an ever-increasing tendency of cartels to use insurgent tactics to achieve their political aims, such as the use of roadblocks to hinder military reinforcement. Vladimir Ramirez, a political scientist in Culiacán, explained that although the gunmen did not intentionally target noncombatants initially, the menace posed by the cartel remained clear. The citizens of Sinaloa, who have been subject and well-exposed to cartel reign, recognized this. The usual elusive quality of cartel gunmen had, in this case, materialized; their visible and violent presence forcing families to hide in small, anxiety-provoking spaces as described by Televisa. “It was a threat of terrorism,” Ramirez said. “The government acted with great responsibility.” Additionally, El Universal reports that during the operation, Aguaruto prison experienced a breakdown in security, resulting in the escape of approximately 50 prisoners, most of whom originally forfeited their rights due to ties with organized crime. Additionally, many approve of the government’s strategy of release and retreat because according to Milenio, cartel hitmen threatened to kill hostage soldiers and their families if Guzmán remained held by authorities.


Photo: El Economista 

Moving forward, it remains to be seen whether the Mexican president will heed critics’ warnings by cracking down on drug traffickers or continue to pursue a self-described approach focused on “hugs, not gunfights” (abrazos, no balazos). Clearly, though, what occurred in Sinaloa on October 17th has increased pressure on the López Obrador administration to develop a coherent and effective strategy to reduce both violent crime and the threat of Mexico’s powerful organized crime groups.

Sources:

Camhaji, Elijah. “Ovidio Guzmán, el hijo de El Chapo cuya detención ha desatado la violencia en Culiacán.” El País. October 18th, 2019.

Milenio Digital. “Gobierno va tras hijo de ‘El Chapo’; ‘que no haya impunidad’, dice AMLO.” Milenio. October 22, 2019.

Espino, Manuel. “Semestre récord en violencia en México.” El Universal. 2 Jul. 2019. 

“En Sinaloa, Gabinete de Seguridad optó por proteger la vida de las personas: presidente AMLO.” Sitio Oficial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 18 Oct. 2019. 

Consulta Mitofsky. “Liberación de Ovidio Guzmán: dos visiones diferentes.” El Economista. 22 Oct. 2019. 

Heinle, K. “AMLO deploys National Guard amidst controversy.” Justice in Mexico. 24 Jul. 2019. 

Linthicum, Kate & Sanchez, Cecelia. “Eight killed in Mexico as cartel gunmen force authorities to release El Chapo’s son.” Los Angeles Times. October 18, 2019. 

Grillo, Ioan. “Drug Cartel Control Is No Peace.” The New York Times. October 22, 2019. 

Megamedia. “Trasciende molestia del jefe del Ejército con AMLO tras la fallida operación en Culiacán.” Diario de Yucatán.October 20, 2019. 

Noticieros Televisa. “Miedo y ansiedad: lo que dejó la violencia del Cártel de Sinaloa en Culiacán.” Televisa. 29 Oct. 2019. 

Beauregard, Luis Pablo. “El hijo de El Chapo, tras su detención en Culiacán: ‘Ya paren todo, ya me entregué, no quiero más desmadre.’” El Universal. 30 Oct. 2019. 

What the Trial of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Revealed About The Inner Workings of the Sinaloa Cartel

 

"El Chapo" at his trial, Courtroom sketch by Christine Cornell

Sketch by Christine Cornell

03/19/19- (written by Aitanna Ferrez) Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán was convicted in the Southern District of New York on Tuesday, February 12, 2019 on all counts brought against him for his role in directing the Sinaloa Cartel since roughly the 1980s. The trial revealed significant details about the Sinaloa Cartel, how it works, who is involved and where their business is conducted, providing a greater understanding of how this specific cartel has contributed to corruption and violence in Mexico. In the wake of his arrest and extradition to the United States, business of the cartel seems to be carrying on as usual, there is an ongoing epidemic of U.S. drug overdoses, and violence in Mexico has reached record levels. Understanding the impact of the Sinaloa Cartel and where it may be headed in Guzman’s absence requires a careful review of what we now know about the organization.

Background on the Sinaloa Cartel

According to InSight Crime, the Sinaloa Cartel began as a small group of farming families who switched to drug trafficking in the 1960s and 70s. In the 1980s, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán officially founded the Sinaloa Cartel. Up until his arrest in January 2016, Guzmán served with Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada Garcia as what has been perceived as head of the drug trafficking organization.

The Sinaloa Cartel achieved success in part because of its relatively decentralized structure, with different geographic divisions of the network working together as “separate but cooperating organizations.” Indeed, though identified as the organization’s formal leaders in principal, InSight Crime reports that both Guzmán and Zambada Garcia historically maintained their own individual organizational structures within the Sinaloa Cartel. Meanwhile, many of the Sinaloa Cartel’s activities and operations in Mexico and internationally were “outsourced” to local suppliers, distributors, and other partners.

According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, in an interview with ABC News, it was “El Chapo” Guzmán’s ability to “institutionalize power systems and relationships” that largely enabled the cartel to expand. According to Bret Hamilton, assistant special agent for Alabama’s sector of the DEA, the Sinaloa cartel is said to control about one-fourth of the drug traffic within the Mexican Region, with an even larger reach and hold on the United States.”

The effect of the reach of the Sinaloa Cartel and its network of contraband trade has had translates directly into its ability to, as InSight affirms, “successfully [penetrate] government and security forces wherever it operates.” As stated in a June 2018 CRS report, the Sinaloa Cartel has “successfully corrupted public officials from the local to the national level inside Mexico and abroad to operate in some 50 countries,” allowing it to become the top supplier of illicit psychotropic substances in the United States.

What We Learned from the Guzmán Trial

The trial of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán was a lesson in and of itself on how the Sinaloa Cartel’s success has been contingent upon the high level of corruption within the Mexican police, military, and government. Witness testimony during the trial brought to the surface countless allegations against Guzmán and the Sinaloa Cartel, and corruption was arguably the prominent theme that emerged throughout.

As revealed in a VICE News podcast, the corruption of the Sinaloa Cartel is practically embedded in all aspects of life in Mexico. Two testimonies in particular – one delivered by a former government official Lucero Sanchez Lopez, who became a mistress of Guzmán and the other by Alex Cifuentes, a relative of one of Guzmán’s primary cocaine suppliers in Colombia – brought to light the degree of high-level corruption of the Mexican government by the Sinaloa Cartel. In addition, according to the New York Times following the final presentation of evidence, reports delivered the prosecution revealed possibly the most shocking claims against Mr. Guzmán, accusing the crime lord of “routinely rap[ing] girls as young as 13 years old.”

The first witness’ testimony illustrated the way that government officials fell under Guzmán’s sway even as they were sworn to enforce the law. Cifuentes, meanwhile, alleged that the cartel was able to bribe officials even at the highest levels of office, including then-president Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), who allegedly accepted a bribe of $100 million to protect the Sinaloa Cartel from authorities.

Looking Ahead

The Sinaloa Cartel, though constantly challenged within Mexico by other drug trafficking organizations, seems to prosper well due to its significant international network, even after the guilty verdict of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. In an interview with PBS Newshour, Mike Vigil, the former chief of international operations for the DEA, comments that capturing and convicting Guzmán “was a great moral victory for the rule of law, [but] it did very little to have a negative impact on the Sinaloa Cartel.” With the drugs continuing to be shipped, the Mexican government no longer hunting down drug lords, and Guzmán’s fate of little importance, the Sinaloa Cartel seems to continue to persist with business as usual.

 

Sources:

 

Beittel, June. “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations.” Congressional Research Service, 3 July 2018, pp. 1–28. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf.

Feuer, Alan. “El Chapo Drugged and Raped 13-Year-Old Girls, Witness Claims.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 2 Feb. 2019. www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/nyregion/el-chapo-trial.html.

 

Keneally, Meghan. “How El Chapo’s Sinaloa Drug Cartel Spread Its Reach Across US.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 13 July 2015. www.abcnews.go.com/International/el-chapos-sinaloa-drug-cartel-spread-reach-us/story?id=32421054.

 

Robinson, Carol. “Mexico’s Sinaloa Drug Cartel Leaving Deadly Mark on Alabama.” AL.com, Advance Local Media LLC., 23 July 2018. www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2018/07/what_is_the_sinaloa_mexican_dr.html.

 

“Sinaloa Cartel.” InSight Crime, 30 Jan. 2018. www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/.

 

“The Verdict.” Chapo: Kingpin on Trial. VICE News/Spotify. 19 February 2019. https://open.spotify.com/show/3iZGZfoQX9kfzdZtAYi2s2?si=wxEH63CcQD2B50avZt8XJg.

 

Verza, Maria, and Mark Stevenson. “After El Chapo Conviction, Sinaloa Drug Cartel Carries On.” PBS, KPBS, 12 Feb. 2019. www.pbs.org/newshour/world/after-el-chapo-conviction-sinaloa-drug-cartel-carries-on.

 

Verza, Maria, and Mark Stevenson. “Despite ‘El Chapo’ Arrest, Mexico’s Powerful Sinaloa Drug Cartel Still Raking in Cash around the World.” The Japan Times, 13 Feb. 2019. www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/13/world/crime-legal-world/despite-el-chapo-arrest-mexicos-powerful-sinaloa-drug-cartel-still-raking-cash-around-world/#.XGxRBc9KigQ.

 

 

 

 

Alleged Mexican Government Corruption Exposed During the El Chapo Trial

Trial of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán. Image Source: USA Today.

Trial of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. Source: USA Today.

02/11/19 (written by aferrez) The evidentiary phase of the trial of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, the purported leader the of the Sinaloa drug cartel, came to a conclusion on Wednesday, January 30, 2019 after having raised newfound speculation about the extent of the corruption in Mexico.

The trial included testimony from at least 16 of Guzmán’s “underlings and allies, some of whom served as cartel bag men.” Several of these witnesses are among those who made allegations of corruption about Mexican government officials, including members of the current and past Mexican presidential administrations.

According to Alan Feuer of The New York Times, “It is no secret that Mexico’s drug cartels have, for decades, corrupted the authorities with dirty money.” Nonetheless, the testimony of some witnesses brought several shocking allegations. For example, the testimony of Vicente Zambada, son of Ismael Zambada an alleged partner of Guzmán. On the witness stand, Zambada claimed his father had a bribery budget of one million dollars a month, and all of it went to high ranking government officials.

In addition to allegations brought forth by Zambada, another witness named Miguel Angel Martínez brought further allegations against Mexican authorities. According to Martínez’s testimony reported by again by Alan Feuer of The New York Times, the chief of Mexico City’s federal police, Guillermo González Calderoni, was the first official on Guzmán’s payroll in the late 1980s, and has since allegedly provided Guzmán with “secret information on an almost daily basis.” This information included, but was not limited to, the disclosure of a radar system installed on the Yucatán Peninsula by the United States government to track Guzmán’s drug flights from Columbia.

The testimony of such witnesses underscored the fact that major drug trafficking operations necessarily involve some significant level of government complicity. This was point was made especially clear by Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadía, a Columbian supplier of Guzmán, who was quoted by The New York Timesas stating that “It’s impossible to be the leader of a drug cartel in Columbia without having corruption…they go hand in hand.” Abadía testified that in order to traffic drugs internationally, his organization paid off everyone from journalists to tax officials.

As revealing as the trial has been with such examples, some experts think the revelations of corruption only scratch the surface. Feuer notes “the trial is offering a public airing of the crimes of the Sinaloa drug cartel –– but is only revealing ‘what the government would like us to hear.’” Indeed, Judge Brian M. Cogan, who presided over the case, had initially instructed some witnesses that they must refrain from discussing alleged corruption of government officials in Mexico because, “It would needlessly embarrass certain individuals and entities.” Nonetheless, the trial brought forth numerous specific details that suggested high level government involvement in the drug trade.

Perhaps the most shocking allegation of the trial was the claim that Guzmán directed a payment of $100 million dollar to then-sitting president Enrique Peña Nieto. Alex Cifuentes Villa, the Colombian drug lord who delivered the testimony against Peña Nieto, is recorded to have saidthat the Sinaloa cartel was initially contacted by Peña Nieto about the time he was elected president in late 2012, according toAlan Feuer at The New York Times. Feuer also notes that Cifuentes Villa testified that Enrique Peña Nieto asked Guzmán for $250 million in exchange for calling off a nationwide manhunt for himduring the campaign. Both Peña Nieto and the López Obrador government vehemently refuted the allegations brought against them and their administrations on social media and in public statements to the press.

In response to these allegations, the defense counsel representing Guzmán raised questions about the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. In a quote for an article produced by BBC News Mundo, lead defense attorney Jeffrey Lichtman asserted that those testifying against Guzmán are, for the most part, members of the Sinaloa cartel themselves and their testimony is likely intended to gain them leniency on sentences that they are currently serving. Lichtman believes the level of legitimacy of the witnesses is tainted by the fact that they are “men who have cheated all their lives.” Indeed, several witnesses who testified during the trial reportedly struck deals with the prosecution in an effort to receive reduced sentences or U.S. visas.

The final ruling on Guzmán’s fate remains in the hands of the jury, which at the time of this posting was still deliberating on a verdict.  Regardless of the outcome, some analysts raised questions about whether there would be a reckoning for corrupt officials, given the details that were revealed at trial. In an interview with CBC Radio, Anabel Hernández, author of Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and their Godfathers, stated, “The trial of El Chapo Guzmán is very symbolic…but the problem is that [it] will not resolve all the corruption, all the laundering of money that exists in Mexico, and that helps the Sinaloa Cartel, and also other cartels, to exist.”

Meanwhile, the trafficking of drugs to the United States continues unabated. Guzmán’s alleged partner, Ismael Zambada, remains at large and numerous other drug trafficking organizations continue to thrive in Mexico. Numerous sources reporting on the Guzmán trial note that this drug trafficking activity and the corruption that results is likely to continue as long as there is a voracious appetite for narcotics in the United States.

Sources:

Lissardy, Gerardo. “Juicio a ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán: La Batalla Clave De Los Testigos Comienza Con Relatos Épicos De Envíos De Cocaína, Dinero Sucio y Corrupción – BBC News Mundo.” BBC News, BBC, 15 Nov. 2018.https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46217746

Feuer, Alan. “El Chapo Trial Shows That Mexico’s Corruption Is Even Worse Than You Think.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 28 Dec. 2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/nyregion/el-chapo-trial-mexico-corruption.html

Tremonti, Anna Maria. “The Current: Trial of El Chapo Won’t Resolve the Corruption That Empowered Him, Says Journalist | CBC Radio.” CBCnews, CBC/Radio Canada, 7 Jan. 2019.https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-january-7-2019-1.4963706/trial-of-el-chapo-won-t-resolve-the-corruption-that-empowered-him-says-journalist-1.4968242

Feuer, Alan. “Former Mexican President Peña Nieto Took $100 Million Bribe, Witness at El Chapo Trial Says.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 15 Jan. 2019.

 www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/nyregion/el-chapo-trial.html.