09/30/2024 (written by ecary) –One of the last presidential actions of Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) was passing an ambitious judicial reform, aiming to end corruption and give citizens the power of electing their own judicial operators. With AMLO’s changes, 7,000+ of Mexico’s judges and magistrates are to be elected by popular vote rather than the previous process of Presidential nomination and Senate approval. The reform also lowers qualification requirements and removes the professional exam component. Tense debates and protests are arising across the country, including in the Supreme Court itself, where judges went on strike September 3-17.
Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, AMLO’s fellow Morena successor to the presidency, appeared beside him as he formally signed his transformative judicial reform into the Official Journal of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación, DOF) on September 15th. The lower house of the legislature approved the reform last month, and the Senate, though typically more conservative and resistant to major government structure changes, followed suit on September 11th. More than half of Mexico’s 32 states have already incorporated the judicial reforms in their legislatures, indicating strong and broad support across the nation.
This third iteration of Morena plans has nearly cleared all the hurdles in its long path to fruition. The final test will be in actual execution of judicial election procedures, the first round of which is scheduled to take place in June 2025. Outside of banning political party affiliation for judicial candidates, the legislature has yet to specify any further electoral guidelines.
The Path to Morena’s Plan C
The reform is part of a “Plan C” from Mexico’s left-leaning party, Morena, after two prior plans (A and B) attempting constitutional reform failed to be approved by the legislature and courts. In April 2022, AMLO publicized his Plan A of constitutional changes as a means of reducing the costs of democratic elections by reducing the number of electoral councilors from 11 to 6, lowering the number of local congress members, introducing electronic voting, and empowering the National Electoral Institute (INE) to become singularly responsible for election management through its absorption of the formerly independent Local Public Organizations network.
When this failed before the national Congress, he proposed Plan B in November 2022. This plan no longer included direct constitutional changes, but rather focused on altering secondary election laws, including proposed decreases in the administrative apparatuses and offices of the INE. He claimed that his core interests in these reforms remained cost reduction and fraud elimination. Plan B was approved by Congress in December 2022, but ultimately deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in March 2023, spurring the formulation and announcement of the present Plan C.
Implications of the Judicial Reform
Advocates argue judicial elections will reduce nepotism and ensure greater accountability to direct constituents. They contend that judges, who ultimately determine the constitutionality of laws and the actions of other authorities, are the most important officials to be chosen by all citizens without the distortion of elite politician input.
However, critics argue that these reforms dangerously eliminate Mexico’s already fragile system of checks and balances, especially on the presidency. AMLO has already demonstrated his desire to unilaterally alter the constitution in the previously mentioned Morena Plans A and B. With another Morena member assuming the presidency after winning a decisive 60% of the popular vote, and the same party possessing a majority in both houses of the legislature, Morena now has the power to make potentially more radical changes. Critics warn that this moment of heightened single-party power is the most precarious time to remove the final remaining check on the executive branch.
Furthermore, elections risk politicizing the judiciary. Judges will join the ranks of politicians at the whim of public opinion and campaign funding mega donors. Running successful campaigns requires extensive resources and high-level connections, a recipe for creating more corrupt officials. Lastly, critics also point out that law enforcement entities like the police, National Guard, and prosecutors are equally corrupt but not addressed anywhere in this reform.
These changes affect the security of Mexican citizens in several ways. First, access to fair, impartial judges may be compromised; while there is the idealistic possibility that individuals of mid-lower socioeconomic class could mobilize their majority to keep judges more actively to their interests, it is likely that rates of impunity will rise for those with the resources to offer generous campaign contributions. Another factor to consider is the economic security impacts; already foreign investors are slowing and withdrawing resources from Mexico in response to the uncertainty created by AMLO’s judicial reform, questioning the future reliability of the legal system under which they are doing business. Finally, judges could become financially dependent on entities with profitable but perhaps illegal operations, like the various cartels and organized crime syndicates already threatening the integrity of Mexican government. Despite the post-pandemic surge in nearshoring desires, these reforms still threaten to reduce investment opportunities and destabilize the economy, negatively impacting all Mexican citizens and the larger US-Mexico-Canada free trade region.
Conclusion
In a culmination of Morena’s years long efforts to alter Mexico’s constitution and electoral rules, Plan C finally reached official enactment earlier this month promising election via popular vote for the Mexican judicial branch. These AMLO-spearheaded reforms threaten not only Mexican citizens, but the economic integration of the entire continent, especially as the USMCA agreement is due for review in just two years. While these reforms promise to empower the people and diminish corruption, significant challenges remain. Domestically, these challenges include judicial politicization and the loss of checks and balances. Internationally, the negative economic fallout from these judicial reforms threatens the continental free trade region to which Mexico is (at least for the time being) a critical contributor and benefactor.
Sources
Sánchez, Arturo and Urrutia, Alonso. “Se actuó conforme a la Constitución en el proceso de la reforma judicial: AMLO.” La Jornada. Sept. 17, 2024. https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2024/09/17/politica/se-actuo-conforme-a-la-constitucion-en-el-proceso-de-reforma-judicial-amlo-8785.
Sígala, Alejandra. “Cuando se cambiaran de jueces?: estas son las fechas clave de la Reforma Judicial.” Milenio. Sept. 16, 2024. https://www.milenio.com/politica/las-fechas-clave-de-la-reforma-al-poder-judicial.
Barragán, Almudena. “Los trabajadores de la Suprema Corte terminan el paro por la reforma judicial.” El País. Sept. 12, 2024. https://elpais.com/mexico/2024-09-12/los-trabajadores-de-la-suprema-corte-terminan-el-paro-por-la-reforma-judicial.html.
Verdugo, Eduardo. “López Obrador se alista a promulgar reforma judicial, aprobada por la mayoría de los congresos locales.” Los Ángeles Times. Sept. 12, 2024. https://www.latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2024-09-12/lopez-obrador-se-alista-a-promulgar-reforma-judicial-aprobada-por-la-mayoria-de-congresos-locales.
Porter, Eduardo. “Can Mexico’s democracy survive Lopez Obrador’s judicial reforms?” The Washington Post. Sept. 10, 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/09/10/mexico-judiciary-reform-democracy-amlo/.
Brewer, Stephanie. “Judicial Reform in Mexico: A Setback for Human Rights.” Washington Office on Latin America. Aug 20, 2024. https://www.wola.org/analysis/judicial-reform-in-mexico-a-setback-for-human-rights/.
Yáñez, Brenda. “Las claves de los planes “A”, “B”, y “C” de AMLO a favor de una reforma electoral.” Expansión Política. May 13, 2023. https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2023/05/13/las-claves-de-los-planes-a-b-y-c-de-amlo-a-favor-de-una-reforma-electoral.
